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Sentimental politics or structural injustice? The ambivalence of emotions for 
political responsibility. 
 
Naomi Head 
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Abstract 
Stories and representations of suffering are frequently central to attempts to arouse our 
emotions and initiate political action.  Yet, the evocation of emotion and, in particular, 
empathy, remains politically ambivalent.  It does not necessarily lead to the 
acknowledgement of political responsibility or to actions to address the historically-
constituted roots of contemporary structural injustices.  Moving beyond the legal, moral, 
and institutional boundaries of political responsibility, this article argues for greater 
recognition of its affective dimensions.  In particular, it differentiates between a 
sentimental politics and testimonial empathy to better understand the affective dynamics 
of political responsibility.  While the former finds close company with pity and a lack of 
acknowledged political responsibility, the latter offers an ethical-political orientation 
towards radical reflexivity and social transformation, situating experiences of injustice 
within wider networks of power, privilege, and agency.  Drawing on the work of feminist, 
cultural, and social theorists, the article offers a critical conceptualisation of testimonial 
empathy and its limits.  The article illustrates the insights offered by re-thinking political 
responsibility in terms of testimonial empathy through a close reading of a historical 
account of structural injustice – slavery in the United States – as written in Harriet A. 
Jacobs’ 1861 slave narrative. 
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Introduction 
When the image of Alan Kurdi swept across the world on 2 September 2015, there was 
an immediate optimism that the emotional explosion generated by this death – amongst 
so many – would see a transformation of attitudes and political action towards refugees 
and asylum seekers.  Kurdi was a 3- year old toddler whose image was captured by 
photographer Nilufer Demir as he lay dead, face down, on a Turkish beach at the edge of 
the Mediterranean.  He wore a red t-shirt and blue shorts and had shoes on bare legs.  His 
image crystalized, and screamed to a deaf world, the depth of vulnerability and 
desperation that migrants were experiencing in trying to make the crossing from Syria to 
Europe. Many inches of newspaper print and commentary were dedicated to the notion 
that the emotions triggered by Kurdi’s image should generate a sense of political 
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responsibility amongst the global community, extending from international 
organisations to states and national leaders, to civil society organisations and grassroots 
communities.  It was claimed that the affective encounter with the image of Kurdi’s death 
and the story that this represented would move citizens and nations alike to become 
active agents and engage in meaningful political action to end the suffering of those in 
similar positions.  As Britain’s Chief Rabbi, Ephraim Mirvis, noted, ‘For far too long, we 
have related to these suffering individuals as if they are people who are living on Mars.  
Thanks to that image, that desperately sad and tragic image, it’s moved our hearts…It’s 
an image of that boy that has brought us to our senses and we must respond adequately’ 
(O’Hagan 2015).  Former UK prime minister David Cameron declared that “as a father I 
felt deeply moved” in response to the images of Kurdi, while former French prime 
minister Manuel Valls said a “Europe-wide mobilisation is urgent” (ABC 2015).  Cameron 
went on to say that “Britain is a moral nation and we will fulfil our moral responsibilities”, 
a task which requires that we “try and stabilize the countries from which these people 
are coming” (Tharoor 2015). Italian premier Matteo Renzi said that “[f]aced with these 
images which tear and move the hearts of every father, we must be aware that we need a 
global strategy and Europe cannot lose face” (ABC 2015).   
What is concealed by this highly affective response to Kurdi’s death is 
acknowledgement of the ‘shared and interconnected histories that link Europe and the 
migrants washing up on its shores’ (Danewid 2017: 1681; Sirriyeh 2018).   This discourse 
of urgent emotion works to erase the links between Europe’s colonial past – and its 
ongoing involvement in war/peace operations - and the countries where the majority of 
migrants seeking asylum come from, such as Somalia, Libya, Iraq, Eritrea, Syria and 
Afghanistan (Danewid 2017: 1680).  While what has been termed a ‘refugee crisis’ 
reflects contemporary injustices perpetrated and experienced in the present, ‘it is not 
possible to tell this story of the production and reproduction of [structural injustice] 
without reference to the past’ (Young 2011: 185; Sirriyeh 2018).  The image of a child – 
vulnerable, helpless, and stripped of political agency – was a powerful conduit for 
legitimating an emotional narrative that formed in relation to some migrants.  Yet such 
an emotional narrative did not expand to include all migrants and asylum-seekers.  In the 
rendering of lived experiences of (some) others’ misery through news reports, images, 
social media representations and first-hand testimonies, what was produced was a 
sentimental discourse which maintained the asymmetry between spectator and sufferer, 
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largely refused to seriously engage with the affective and political claims of migrants and 
asylum-seekers upon European states, and was only temporarily disrupted by acts of 
resistance mobilised by the inadequate political response.  Consequently, the emotions 
and narratives – historical and contemporary - of which this photographic testimony 
became a part were far more complex than was represented by the media and politicians.  
Emotions, in this political context, were profoundly ambivalent, serving as both sites of 
resistance and calls for change as well as support for the status quo (Schick 2019).  I 
suggest that the initial outburst of emotional responses to a single picture elided complex 
expressions of empathy, compassion and pity.  In doing so it revealed not only the 
affective dimension of our engagement with questions of political responsibility, but also 
the need to avoid an easy slippage into a sentimental politics.   While a sentimental 
politics is likely to signal alignment with a certain set of moral values, thereby simulating 
a desire for justice, it nonetheless lacks a sustained political commitment and evades 
questions of political responsibility for suffering embedded in historically constituted 
global structural injustices.   
The story of Alan Kurdi draws our attention to the problem of political 
responsibility in response to individual and collective experiences of structural injustice.  
The focus on understanding and communicating human vulnerability as a cause of 
collective political responsibility is relevant to a wide range of contemporary harms 
which are embedded in forms of historically-constituted structural injustice, such as 
conflict, occupation, poverty, economic precarity, climate and environmental insecurity.  
Often in such contexts the focus on the individual’s narrative distracts us from its position 
within wider networks of power.  Reflexive calls for political responsibility and action 
may be easily marginalised in the urgency of a sentimental politics that beats its collective 
brow but enacts little change.  Moreover, the political work of these ‘humanising’ 
emotions – often perceived as an antidote to humanitarian crisis – is not always critically 
examined despite their crucial role in both resisting and enabling forms of oppression 
constitutive of injustice.  What is revealed by a sentimental politics is the potential for 
collective emotions to be mobilised to support existing structures of power which work 
to limit what are perceived as legitimate demands for political responsibility and political 
change. Interrogating the political character of empathy and the discourses through 
which it is represented reveals how some groups and identities are brought within its 
umbrella of care, concern, and responsibility, while others are excluded.  In other words, 
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it offers insights into the situated and historical dynamics of power that shape our 
responses to the experiences of others.   
The account of political responsibility offered in this article takes seriously the 
epistemological claims made by testimonial narrative and the affective dimensions of our 
encounters with experiences and subjects of injustice.  The ethical and political practice 
of what I have termed ‘testimonial empathy’ works to challenge the fleeting and 
asymmetric nature of a sentimental politics which all too often reinscribes the ‘other’ as 
victim or threat through emotional expressions which are articulated independently 
from any recognition of wider structural relations of power and, therefore, political 
responsibilities (see also Sirriyeh 2018: 27).  As such, testimonial empathy recognises 
suffering as an object of affective connection and structural injustice as a site of collective 
responsibility and action1.  It recognises the ‘potential for empathy to disrupt and resist 
hegemonic emotional regimes’ (Schick 2019: 265).  It acknowledges both the individual 
and the interconnected structural experiences of injustice, retaining a capacity to engage 
with the narrative of the particular without losing sight of its location within broader 
relationships of power.  Testimonial empathy draws attention to the affective dimension 
of everyday epistemic practices and their political consequences: whose narratives are 
accepted as valid knowledge claims and accounts of injustice and how do we make 
meaning of our own and others’ experiences?  
The article proceeds in four parts.  The first section considers the relationship 
between structural injustice and political responsibility, following Iris Marion Young’s 
account of historically-situated structural injustice as the driving force for political 
responsibility (see also Lu 2017).  Young understands political responsibility to emerge 
out of an understanding and recognition of the degree to which we are all, as citizens of a 
global and interconnected world, implicated in the suffering of both proximate and 
distant others as a consequence of structural injustices.  I engage with Young’s and 
Hannah Arendt’s conceptualisation of political responsibility wherein it becomes clear 
that both scholars identify a set of ethically-attuned political responsibilities as intrinsic 
to our role as citizens in political communities.   
In the second section, I unpack the concept of testimonial empathy in more detail, 
situating it within Young’s argument regarding the importance of connection in locating 
                                                          
1 My thanks to one of the reviewers for this phrasing. 
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and acknowledging our responsibility towards others.  Within the asymmetry of power 
that Young acknowledges as always characterizing our relations, what is at stake is ‘not 
only the ability to empathize with the very distant other, but to recognize oneself as 
implicated in the social forces that create the climate of obstacles the other must confront’ 
(Boler 1997: 263).  Empathy is often variously represented as benign, apolitical, a moral 
resource for civilising processes, ineffectual as a site or source of political change, and 
dangerous as a guide for political action.  Many of these arguments implicitly, if not 
explicitly, acknowledge empathy as both an ethical and political act, while rarely focusing 
on the significance and form of its political interventions (for exceptions see Boler 1997; 
Chabot Davis 2004; Hemmings 2011; Pedwell 2014, 2016; Head 2016a, Head 2016b; 
Schick 2019).  Testimonial empathy offers a more radical and reflexive engagement with 
others which places greater emphasis on listening with humility, a recognition of 
asymmetric vulnerabilities, a recognition of the distance between listener and narrator, 
and a willingness to position and interrogate the self within these global 
interconnections.  The key distinction which emerges from such an encounter is between 
empathy2 as generative of political action which recognises and responds to the 
vulnerability of others constituted through historical narratives of structural injustice, 
and pity for those suffering which instead tends to lead to a passive or short-term 
engagement, voyeurism, the commodification of suffering, and an erasure of the histories 
of structural violence and injustice which have contributed to contemporary suffering.   
In the third section I turn to the insights offered by re-thinking political 
responsibility in terms of testimonial empathy through a reading of a historical account 
of structural injustice offered in Harriet A. Jacobs’ 1861 slave narrative, Incidents of a 
                                                          
2 Empathy, along with sympathy, compassion, and pity, is defined in multiple, overlapping and 
contradictory ways in a variety of literatures.  In this article, following Pedwell (2016) I am referring to 
empathy as a socio-political relationship which involves affective, cognitive, and perceptive processes 
that does not seek to erase the self through identification with the Other and acknowledges the 
qualitative difference and distance of the Other as a unique and equal individual.  Ultimately, I have 
chosen to adopt the term ‘testimonial empathy’ rather than compassion - despite areas of overlap 
identified within critical scholarship - as a way of avoiding additional confusion and addressing two 
related factors: 1) compassion in Arendtian (and etymological) terms focuses on a process of co-suffering 
which does not extend beyond the individual’s experience in the private sphere and cannot contribute to 
non-violent political transformation to address injustice.  This definition is the subject of my critique and 
therefore suggests the need for alternative terminology.  2) The historical usage of compassion, sympathy 
and pity have evolved stronger associations with hierarchical relationships and charity which, while 
relevant for a liberal sentimental politics, do not serve a more radically reflexive purpose.  The literature 
on empathy suggests the importance of a more reflexive distinction between self and other which, under 
conditions of asymmetric vulnerabilities, is important for the ethical and political orientation of my 
argument.    
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Slave Girl, Written by Herself.  A direct product of colonialism, slavery is a prima facie 
example of global structural injustice.  Jacobs’ testimonial narrative explicitly addresses 
concerns of class, gender, sex and race that remain fundamental to experiences of 
suffering and injustice in global political relations.  As I illustrate, an examination of such 
historical and contemporary narratives reveals where and with whom political 
responsibility may lie, how it might be recognised and acknowledged, and the powerful 
social, affective, economic and political dynamics which work to prevent such 
acknowledgement.  Jacobs’ testimony mobilises a series of epistemological and affective 
claims in her attempt to achieve her desired political transformations regarding slavery. 
In the fourth and final section, I bring together the earlier theoretical interventions 
with the analysis of Jacobs’ testimony to suggest that testimonial empathy offers an ethics 
of encounter shaped by ambiguity, uncertainty, rupture, disorientation, the risk of 
transformation, and differences lived rather than commonalities shared.  Highlighting the 
many affective obstacles to such encounters, I conclude that emotions – and empathy – 
remain profoundly ambivalent: capable of contributing to both a sentimental politics and 
to a recognition of political responsibility oriented to historically-situated structural 
injustices.     
 
Structural injustice and political responsibility 
In her work on sweatshop labour and global justice, Iris Marion Young articulated a series 
of claims regarding the responsibilities that we hold towards others as a consequence of 
our imbrication in complex global social processes.  The problem that she focuses on is 
the nature of individual responsibility in relation to unjust outcomes produced by ‘large-
scale social structures in which millions participate, but of which none are the sole or 
primary cause’ (2004: 374).  Structural injustice she defines as existing when: 
 
social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat 
of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their 
capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate 
or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their 
capacities.  Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the 
wrongful action of an individual agent or the wilfully repressive policies of 
a state (2006: 114).  
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Young’s entry point to this dilemma of accountability is to distinguish between a 
liability model of responsibility and a social connection model of responsibility (2006).  
The liability model establishes a direct causal link between the actions of specific agents 
and their outcomes; it is, in other words, blame-oriented.  As such it is backward-looking, 
whereby the primary concern is to ensure punishment or to extract compensation.  This 
form of responsibility is moral and legal in that it attributes responsibility for what has 
been done to particular agents.  Young’s articulation of a social connection model of 
political responsibility, by contrast, refers to a broader set of relationships which connect 
distant individuals and collectives with transnational structures and processes through 
which widespread and egregious harms occur.   
Young is keen to emphasise the distinction between political responsibility and 
blame.  The latter, which features centrally within the liability model, she sees as an 
impediment to motivating political action as it is likely to be met with defensive 
behaviour, a re-distribution or mitigation of liability, and the accusation of others.  This 
characterisation of political responsibility as something that belongs both to the 
individual and the collective is not a careless moral or legal conflation of guilt with actions 
not actually committed by individuals, but a form of responsibility that is uniquely 
political in that it is part and parcel of membership of a community without which we 
cannot live – or act - as human beings.  In a similar fashion, Hannah Arendt distinguishes 
between political responsibility and guilt.  Arendt is highly sceptical of expressions of 
guilt for actions not directly committed by individuals as she sees it as an attempt to 
‘escape from the pressure of very present and actual problems into a cheap 
sentimentality’, thereby avoiding what should properly be understood as a form of 
political responsibility to actively pursue justice (2006: 251).   
Young draws on Arendt’s conceptualisation of political responsibility in order to 
develop an alternative to the liability model.  For Arendt, political responsibility, which is 
clearly separated from moral and legal responsibility, is a collective affair.  She writes that 
‘legal and moral standards have one very important thing in common – they always relate 
to the person and what the person has done’ (2003: 148).  By contrast, collective 
responsibility requires that ‘I must be held responsible for something I have not done, 
and the reason for my responsibility must be my membership in a group (a collective) 
which no voluntary act of mine can dissolve’ (Arendt 2003: 149).  Young extends this 
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argument, declaring that ‘all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural 
processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices’ 
(2006: 102-3).  Political responsibility derives not from membership of the nation-state 
but from the social and economic structures in which we are embedded and which 
transcend national borders (2004: 376).  It is this premise which is at the heart of Young’s 
social connection model of responsibility. 
A social connection model posits that individuals, political institutions, companies, 
and multinational corporations are all embedded in highly mediated connections to 
structural injustices.  This means that while individuals may not be easily or 
appropriately held accountable for specific harms, neither may individual or collective 
agents be absolved in light of the economic and political stability and profit frequently 
derived through the injustices experienced by others.  In Young’s view, most, if not all of 
us, contribute to varying degrees in the (re)production of structural injustice because we 
follow accepted rules and conventions of the communities in which we live (2003: 41).  
This ‘business as usual’ mind-set fails to question the degree to which ideological and 
habitual ways of thinking and acting fuel the perpetuation of structural injustices.  
Importantly – as shall be seen in the empirical illustration later on - within the social 
connection model those who may be identified as victims of structural injustice can also 
be said to share responsibility with others who perpetuate the unjust structures to 
engage in actions aimed at transforming these structures (Young 2006: 123).  In Young’s 
account, agency in relation to political responsibility is therefore located anywhere 
within the system. 
Where there is clear consensus between Arendt and Young is in the value of 
labelling this notion of responsibility as political.  As Young notes, “political” refers to 
something broader than government: ‘by politics or the political I am referring to the 
activity in which people organize collectively to regulate or transform some aspect of 
their shared social conditions’ (2004: 377).  Young argues that taking responsibility 
means ‘acknowledging that one participates in social processes that have some unjust 
outcomes….My responsibility becomes to enjoin others to reflect on and acknowledge 
their participation in the structural processes, and to listen to their account of how they 
work and our role in them’ (2004: 380, italics added; see also Coles 2004).   
This characterisation of responsibility implies, I argue, four dimensions of an 
ethics of encounter oriented to engaging with political responsibility in response to 
9 
 
structural injustice.  First of all, it suggests a set of interpersonal and representational 
exchanges oriented towards greater understanding of other perspectives and 
experiences that are not shared by all interlocutors; second, it asks that we listen to the 
narratives and testimonies of others who have suffered injustice; thirdly – and most 
uncomfortably – it asks that we hear and reflect on how those narratives implicate our 
own behaviours, attitudes, and practices in the continuation of injustice, and fourthly, it 
acknowledges that political responsibility can be discharged only by joining with others 
in collective action.  While Arendt and Young provide some guidance regarding the 
connection between the political responsibility of citizens and structural injustice, they 
stop short of fully conceptualising modes of attending to the experiences of others which 
facilitate the recognition of such connections and it is in this spirit that testimonial 
empathy builds on and goes beyond existing accounts through an articulation of the four 
dimensions identified.   
 
Walking the line: from pity to testimonial empathy 
Writing on the difficulties of teaching multiculturalism through literary texts, Megan 
Boler distinguished between ‘passive empathy’ and ‘testimonial reading’, wherein the 
difference lies with the responsibility borne by the reader who, in the latter account, 
‘accepts a commitment to rethink her own assumptions, and to confront the internal 
obstacles encountered as one’s views are challenged’ (1997: 262).  Playing on Boler’s 
terminology, I argue that ‘testimonial empathy’ opens up a connection to our political 
responsibility through an acknowledgement that, as citizens, we bear some responsibility 
for reflecting on our relative position of power, agency, and privilege and can locate 
ourselves within these networks.  As Young argued, in so doing, we may become actively 
engaged in unravelling the chains of agency and structure which reach beyond the 
boundaries of our own communities and stretch towards those relations which shape 
structural injustices such as modern slavery, racism, sexism, poverty, climate change, and 
conflict. 
Many of the practices and dispositions called for in a normative demand to attend 
to social and political difference as structural injustice can be located within a politicized 
conceptualisation of empathy.  Indeed, as Pedwell writes, ‘[w]ithin feminist, anti-racist 
and other social theory, the feeling and articulation of empathy has been established as 
crucial to the attainment of cross-cultural and transformational social justice’ (2014: 47; 
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Berlant 1998: 647).  Neither ‘feeling’ nor ‘knowing’ by themselves are sufficient to shift 
from passive or vicarious emotional responses to political responsibility and 
acknowledgement. Situating ‘testimonial empathy’ as a response to structural injustice 
also seeks to prevent reinforcing ‘individualizing and entrepreneurial discourses of 
political responsibility that veil systemic or collective sources of injustice’ (Beausoleil 
2017: 314) while nonetheless recognising that the ‘personal realm of affect and the public 
sphere of political praxis are intertwined’ (Chabot Davis 2004: 402).  Keeping open a 
dialogue between the individual and interconnected collective and structural experiences 
of injustice - often perceived as distinct levels of analysis - is particularly important in 
relation to the distinction drawn between a sentimental politics and the more ethically 
and politically demanding account offered by testimonial empathy.  Here I look more 
closely at the political implications of this distinction by engaging with Arendt’s political 
writings on pity and compassion in the public sphere. 
Arendt famously did not consider compassion (which she often conflated with 
empathy) to be a political matter and she touched upon the question of the place of the 
emotions in relation to the public sphere in a number of her works.  She distinguished 
between compassion, ‘to be stricken with the suffering of someone else as though it were 
contagious, and pity, to be sorry without being touched in the flesh’ (1990: 85).  
Compassion, she argued, ‘cannot be touched off by the sufferings of a whole class or a 
people, or, least of all, mankind as a whole.  It cannot reach out further than what is 
suffered by one person and still remain what it is supposed to be, co-suffering’ (1990: 85).  
Compassion cannot be, Arendt thought, the subject of ‘talkative and argumentative 
interest in the world’ and so cannot change ‘worldly conditions in order to ease human 
suffering’.  But, she warns, ‘if it does, it will shun the drawn-out wearisome processes of 
persuasion, negotiation, and compromise, which are the processes of law and politics, 
and lend its voice to the suffering itself, which must claim for swift and direct action, that 
is, for action with the means of violence’ (1990: 86).  
Arendt’s caution was grounded in the belief that pity - the ‘perversion of 
compassion’ - would instead take root in the public sphere.  She argued that because pity 
‘is not stricken in the flesh and keeps its sentimental distance, [it] can succeed where 
compassion will always fail; it can reach out to the multitude and therefore, like solidarity, 
enter the marketplace’ (1990: 89).  Arendt argued that ‘without the presence of 
misfortune, pity could not exist, and it therefore has…[a] vested interest in the existence 
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of the unhappy’ (1990: 89).  The compassion for the suffering of the people, which Arendt 
argued to be a driving force for Robespierre during the French Revolution became, in his 
insistence on the ‘will of the people’, the downfall of the public sphere.  In its focus on the 
misery of the masses, the emotion became one of pity rather than compassion as the latter 
can only comprehend specific suffering of individuals while the former excels at its 
capacity to generalize, to aggregate humanity into a suffering mass with what Arendt 
understood to be potentially violent repercussions.  Once in the political sphere, pity’s 
capacity for dealing in the abstract rather than the particular suffering of individuals, 
coupled with its instinctive desire to be relished, risks the glorification of its cause – the 
suffering of others (1990: 89) – and the commodification of this suffering through the 
gaze of the spectator. 
Arendt rejects any place for emotions in the public sphere for several reasons.  She 
feared their public eruption in destructive and violent ways as evidenced by her analysis 
of the French Revolution.  They also threatened the strict separation of the social and 
political sphere central to her work, serving to displace politics into the social question 
(1958; 1990).  She argued that compared with the ‘reality which comes from being seen 
and heard’, emotions cannot appear in public unless ‘transformed, deprivatized and 
deindividualized’ (1958: 50).  Moreover, pain ‘is so subjective and removed from the 
world of things and men that it cannot assume an appearance at all’ (1958: 51).  Rather 
than confront the emotion produced by suffering, Arendt wanted the listener to confront 
the reality of suffering.  She was adamant that emotions obscure and limit our capacity 
for thinking through their all-consuming nature and their boundlessness, thereby 
facilitating thoughtlessness which was the basis for her analysis of the evil committed by 
Eichmann.  Thinking should not, she believed, be contaminated by feelings as this 
prevents the possibility of political discussion.  When brought into the public sphere, 
emotions - the motivations of the heart – are likely to be corrupted through their use for 
political purposes.  Coupled with this was the belief that emotions blind or mislead us to 
reality and it is only by enduring the sheer pain of reality that we may avoid falling into 
the trap of thoughtlessness (Nelson 2017: 69).   
Arendt’s caution awakens us to the potential for the boundaries of these affective 
categories to collapse both conceptually and empirically (see also Berlant 1998: 641).  
However, whilst retaining the cautionary thrust of her argument, its limitations are 
relevant to the current conceptualisation of political responsibility.  Broadly speaking, 
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she overlooks – or rejects - the degree to which the political sphere is already always 
affectively constituted (e.g. Ahmed 2004; Kingston and Ferry 2008; Ross 2014; Hutchison 
2016).  More particularly, her concepts of enlarged thought and representative thinking 
or perspective-taking (2006) leave little room for affective dimensions of experience and 
knowledge.  This separation of emotions or affective knowledge from the political sphere 
cannot be sustained.  Within a process of enlarged thinking Arendt does not recognise the 
contestation of suffering as meaning-making mediated in the public sphere.  Yet, the 
experiences and meanings attributed to pain and suffering cannot be so readily identified 
and universally agreed upon that they can be relegated to action in the private sphere as 
Arendt suggests.  Furthermore, Arendt’s reluctance to allow emotions into the public 
sphere misconstrues the degree to which perspective-taking is constituted by and 
through emotional expression.  Thinking, for Arendt, only happens when the person or 
object is removed from our senses (2003: 165).  As such, she does not allow for embodied 
or relational forms of knowledge that enable and constitute ‘thinking’ through the 
encounter.  This is made clear in her definition of representative thinking: 
 
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by 
making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that 
is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt 
the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon 
the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of 
empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of 
counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own 
identity where actually I am not. (Arendt 2006, 237). 
 
The emphasis attributed to the mind, to the imagination of thought and cognition, works 
to remove affective dimensions of knowledge from the purview of the political.  The 
affective and disruptive function of narratives – stories, testimonial accounts, and 
representations - and their role in the political sphere as constitutive of identity, 
contestation, and meaning-making, have little place in Arendt’s account of representative 
thinking.  Moreover, her suggestion of ‘[b]eing and thinking in my own identity where 
actually I am not’ does not capture the hermeneutic resources required to make sense of 
asymmetric social and political experiences (see Fricker 2007). 
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Although Arendt rightly warns of the commodifying effect and spectatorship of 
pity in the public sphere, her conflation of compassion with co-feeling raises concerns 
over appropriation and projections by the non-sufferer and, through its location in the 
private sphere, fails to question when private responses may be either insufficient or a 
part of the practice of injustice (see Berlant 2004: 9).  Set against Arendt’s account, 
multiple scholars have recognised the dynamics of power and politics within pity and 
compassion3 and located them both firmly in the public political sphere (Hoggett 2006; 
Hutchison 2014; Whitebrook 2002; Boltanski 1999; Chouliaraki 2004, 2010; Berlant 
2004; Boler 1997; Pedwell 2014; Zembylas 2013).  Pity, they suggest, denotes the feeling 
of empathic identification with the sufferer, while compassion refers to the feeling 
accompanied by action (Whitebrook 2002: 530).  Echoing Arendt’s caution, pity also 
prefers an object, whereas compassion looks for a subject.  Suggestions of co-feeling, 
however, are rejected in favour of a clear understanding of the need – integral to empathy 
- to maintain an ontological distinction between the self and other (Pedwell 2016).  Pity 
and its politics are laden with dynamics of power wherein the asymmetry between the 
spectator and the sufferer is maintained – often through the over-identification and 
imagined comprehension enabled through sentiment - ensuring that no radical reflexivity 
turns our gaze towards our entanglements in the creation and perpetuation of 
vulnerabilities and injustice.  Compassion, in this reading, is oriented towards recognition 
of the connection between the personal and the political and emphasises the inter-
relational dimensions of the process (Whitebrook 2002).  It entails the political 
recognition that while we are all vulnerable we are not so in the same way or to the same 
degree. 
These reflexive characterisations of compassion – as responsive to the other, as 
relational, as political, and as oriented towards political action – are all integral to the 
conceptualisation of testimonial empathy.  The process and practice of testimonial 
empathy is located within interpersonal encounters as well as more broadly 
representational practices such as historical narratives, testimony, art, images, music, 
and fiction, through which accounts of structural injustice and political responsibility are 
constituted and contested.  Locating political responsibility at the level of interpersonal 
and representational encounters in no way removes or limits the political responsibilities 
                                                          
3 In this critical scholarship compassion is conceptualised in terms akin to testimonial empathy and thus 
the terms, when derived from other authors, are used interchangeably in this section. 
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of states, global political actors or institutions but it does acknowledge that politics 
‘exists, is reinforced and challenged, in the capillaries of the everyday and at the level of 
gestures, practices, and bodies’ (Beausoleil 2017: 314).  As indicated by the 
representation of Kurdi’s story and as narrated in Harriet Jacobs’ account, testimonial 
empathy requires movement from the particular suffering of individuals or groups to 
reflection on more general historical and socio-political conditions constitutive of 
asymmetric vulnerabilities which leads to the acknowledgement of political 
responsibility in the public sphere.  This is not the work of a sentimental politics, the 
consumption of which returns us to a private world of thoughts and feelings: of an 
impotent compassion without action in the public sphere towards a politics of equality, 
of a pity which serves to create distance without reflexivity, or of a comfortable and 
fulfilling outrage which ultimately leaves untouched both subject and injustice alike.   
 
A ‘theatre of compassion’: an encounter with slavery 
Harriet Jacobs’ first-person account of slavery published in 1861, Incidents in the Life of a 
Slave Girl, Written by Herself, and narrated in the voice of Linda Brent, exemplifies an 
appeal for political responsibility to be acknowledged through a process of testimonial 
empathy and it is to a close reading of this narrative that I now turn.  The publication of 
Jacobs’ account was an important marker in slave narratives and in Afro-American 
literature (Yellin 1981; 1987; Stover 2003).  Moreover, it was significant for enabling a 
marginalised and disempowered voice to articulate and, crucially, to curate her 
experiences in the public sphere and, in doing so, to raise consciousness of the 
intersecting harms suffered as a consequence of the structural injustice of slavery.  Jacobs’ 
testimony anticipated contemporary affective perceptions of gendered, racialised, and 
socialised bodies and ideas.  Jacobs’ case for political action rests in large part on the 
affective understanding created in her interlocutors through the self-conscious use of 
narrative that conveys emotion and thick description of both an individual and 
generalised human experience situated within legal and political structures.  Her 
testimony offers insights into our understanding of where and with whom political 
responsibility for injustice lies, how it might be recognised, and the powerful historical, 
social, affective, economic and political dynamics which work to prevent the 
acknowledgement of the epistemic and affective claims made by those who have 
experienced injustice.   
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Each of the four dimensions integral to political responsibility identified in section 
one are clearly represented in Jacobs’ account which calls for political intervention and 
action to end black slavery in the United States of America.  First, Jacobs’ narrative 
provides a form of encounter between author and reader which offers the opportunity 
for greater understanding of experiences and perspectives that are not shared by both 
parties.  Second, Jacobs asks that we listen to her narrative not out of sympathy for her 
personal sufferings, but to reveal the systemic nature of violence and suffering imposed 
by slavery.  To this end she writes ‘Neither do I care to excite sympathy for my own 
sufferings.  But I do earnestly desire to arouse the women of the North to a realizing sense 
of the condition of two millions of women at the South, still in bondage’ (1987: 1).  Her 
account is a plea to both the intellect and emotions of her readers to understand the 
wrongs of slavery and to accept as credible and valid the knowledge claims she is making 
and her interpretation of them.  In doing so, Jacobs reveals a perspective on slavery which 
constituted suffering where it had previously been rendered invisible or marginalised.  
By revealing such suffering, she asks that the reader come to understand it properly and 
act accordingly.  Jacobs is not asking for compassion such as Arendt understands it, as a 
form of ‘co-feeling of suffering’, but rather she seeks an ‘informed passion from someone 
who is without doubt another subject, occupying quite a different position’ (Spelman 
1997: 85).  Third, she asks that in listening to her narrative, white Christian women in the 
north will attend to the uncomfortable implication of their own (racist) practices, 
behaviour, and attitudes for the maintenance of this social and structural injustice.   
Last of all, Jacobs calls for collective political action to end the institution of slavery 
as she writes that she hopes to ‘kindle a flame of compassion in [northern] hearts for my 
sisters who are still in bondage, suffering as I once suffered’.  She asks, ‘why are ye silent, 
ye free men and women of the north?  Why do your tongues falter in maintenance of the 
right?’ Her intention in doing so is with the hope that it may cultivate solidarity and 
enable readers to join those ‘laboring to advance the cause of humanity’, that is, to join 
the abolitionist movement (1987: 29-30).  The affective response Jacobs seeks to invoke 
is intended to trigger action towards greater social and political justice.  As such Jacobs 
utilises her testimony to mobilise affect for specific political ends and, in doing so, 
disrupts the epistemological grounds that her target audience has hitherto been acting 
upon.  The targets of this plea – northern white Christian women in the United States – 
are being asked to undergo the discomforts of travelling towards an abolitionist position 
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through being open and responsive to encountering the experiences of slavery as 
narrated by a black woman who was herself a slave.  Jacobs’ narrative addresses a 
primarily female audience and, as Yellin argues in her Introduction to Incidents, it offers 
a  
 
social analysis asserting that the denial of domestic and familial values by 
chattel slavery is a social issue that its female readers should address in the 
public area.  Jacobs’ Linda Brent does not seek to inspire her audience to 
overcome individual character defects or to engage in reformist activity in 
the private sphere, but urges them to enter the public sphere and work to 
end chattel slavery and white racism.  Informed not by “the cult of 
domesticity” or “domestic feminism” but by political feminism, Incidents is 
an attempt to move women to political action (1987: xxxii). 
 
Recognition of and responsiveness to the experiences of slavery is a necessary 
precondition for, and is generative of, collective political action. Implicit in Jacobs’ call is 
both an affective and epistemological claim upon the listener/reader: alongside 
alternative knowledge of the circumstances of slaves in the south, understanding is 
sought for the purpose of greater recognition and care for other human beings - black 
slaves - and for the transformation of social and political injustice to allow for freedom 
and emancipation of all. 
Jacobs’ account leaves little room for misunderstanding her perception of slavery 
as structural injustice when she addresses herself directly to the reader:  
 
What would you be, if you had been born and brought up a slave, with 
generations of slaves for ancestors?  I admit that the black man is inferior.  
But what is it that makes him so?  It is the ignorance in which white men 
compel him to live; it is the torturing whip that lashes manhood out of him; 
it is the fierce bloodhounds of the South, and the scarcely less cruel human 
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bloodhounds of the north, who enforce the Fugitive Slave Law.  They do the 
work (1987: 44).4   
 
Recognising the mutual, if highly asymmetric, vulnerabilities constituted as a 
consequence of the dual structural injustices of slavery and patriarchy, she goes on to 
write: 
 
I can testify, from my own experience and observation, that slavery is a 
curse to the whites as well as to the blacks.  It makes the white fathers cruel 
and sensual; the sons violent and licentious; it contaminates the daughters, 
and makes the wives wretched….Yet few slaveholders seem to be aware of 
the widespread moral ruin occasioned by this wicked system.  Their talk is 
of blighted cotton crops – not of the blight on their children’s souls (1987: 
54).  
 
The licentiousness of chattel slavery to which Jacobs is referring to forms part of the 
patriarchal institutions and ideologies which maintained political and economic power: 
‘slaveholders have been cunning enough to enact that “the child shall follow the condition 
of the mother,” not of the father; thus taking care that licentiousness shall not interfere 
with avarice’ (1987: 76).  In other words, if the mother is a slave so too shall the children 
– often fathered by slaveholders and their sons - become the property of her owner, to be 
used for labour or sold as befits his economic interests and ensuring a nexus of 
transgenerational injustice and profit. 
Much of Jacobs’ account is an attempt to politicize the stigmatised subject of the 
sexual abuse of slave women.  By situating this issue in the political and public sphere, 
Jacobs is demanding that the suffering it imposes on others be acknowledged and acted 
upon as well as removed from the confines of the private life of the individual slave 
women.  She does this by breaking with literary convention at the time, refusing to 
characterize herself as a passive female victim (Yellin 1987: xxx-xxxi).  Instead, she seeks 
to maintain a degree of moral agency and autonomy through relating her own sexual 
                                                          
4 In 1850 Congress passed a Fugitive Slave Law, ruling that all citizens, including those in northern states 
where slavery had been abolished, would be subject to punishment if they aided fugitive slaves escaping 
from the south. 
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experiences as a tactic which was part of her struggle for freedom and explicitly naming 
her oppression as a sexual object and as a mother who runs away to save her children 
from slavery.  Reflecting an Arendtian call for ‘thinking’, Yellin asks whether Jacobs’ 
intention is to demand that her readers reflect on and re-think the moral standards of 
judgement they apply, asking whether ‘women like herself should be judged (like men) 
on complex moral grounds – rather than (like women) on the single issue of their 
conformity to the sexual behaviour mandated by the white patriarchy?’ (1987: xxxi).   
It is difficult to see, however, how the empathy that Jacobs calls for as leading to 
political action to abolish chattel slavery and its related evils might have been met in 
Arendt’s account.  While representative thinking would likely have revealed the evils of 
slavery, the risk is that the collective response would have turned to either pity or 
violence.  Yet Jacobs’ call for political responsibility rests on an affective account which 
allows her to contest dominant white narratives regarding slavery and its injustices as 
well as to curate what she understands the appropriate response to be.  Drawing on a 
particular affective dimension of her experience and appealing directly to the hearts and 
minds of her predominantly female audience, Jacobs makes frequent references to the 
oppression endured by slave mothers: ‘Could you have seen that mother clinging to her 
child, when they fastened the irons upon his wrist; could you have heard her heart-
rending groans, and seen her bloodshot eyes wander wildly from face to face, vainly 
pleading for mercy; could you have witnessed that scene as I saw it, you would exclaim, 
Slavery is damnable!’ (1987: 23).  The function of the law to protect the rights of 
slaveholders is harnessed, for Jacobs, to patriarchal structures which facilitated and 
enabled the sexual abuse of slave women as well as harming the relationships of white 
women.  She writes that  
 
No matter whether the slave girl be as black as ebony or as fair as her 
mistress.  In either case, there be no shadow of law to protect her from 
insult, from violence, or even from death; all these are inflicted by fiends in 
the shape of men.  The mistress, who ought to protect the helpless victim, 
has no other feelings towards her but those of jealousy and rage’ (1987: 27). 
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In acknowledging the (admittedly asymmetric) suffering of white women, Jacobs 
provides further affective grounds for female support of her cause. 
 Jacobs understands that competing interpretations of ‘the nature of her pain, its 
causes, its consequences, its relative weight, its moral, religious, and social significance’ 
are possible (Spelman 1997: 61).  It is through seeking to assert interpretive control over 
the narrative of slavery that Jacobs sees the means to maintain both her own moral 
agency as well as to draw attention to the responsibility of white people for the 
perpetuation of the suffering created by the institution of slavery.  Jacobs assumed that 
‘debates over the meaning of suffering of slaves were shaped by and were shaping what 
people felt or didn’t feel’ (Spelman 1997: 66) and, therefore, it was imperative to interpret 
and curate – through her own experiences of slavery – the demand for outrage.   
Mobilising anger and outrage was, in her eyes, the path to an acknowledgement of 
responsibility and appropriate action.  These emotions are a necessary counterweight to 
the much easier tendency towards pity which, as Arendt understood, facilitates the 
objectification and commodification of the suffering subject through the gaze of the 
spectator.  In attempting to provoke such emotions, Jacobs sought to prevent the slide 
towards the passive empathy of a sentimental politics whereby a satisfying and self-
centred form of emotional engagement precluded the discomfort of self-reflection and 
the effort of political action.  As Jacobs alludes to, ‘being the object of charity is hardly to 
be compared with being the subject of freedom’ (Spelman 1997: 71).  Jacobs’ argument is 
persuasive partly precisely because it was her argument.  Having refused the assistance 
of white female abolitionist supporters to write her story – and potentially to appropriate 
it - Jacobs’ call for anger and outrage is not an abstract call for charity or compassion as 
co-suffering, but a historically situated and socially astute demand for structural reform 
and restitution for black slaves.  While emotions of anger and outrage direct Jacobs’ 
interlocutors to the slave owners, those that work with them, and the institutions that 
perpetuate slavery, pity (and compassion) focuses our attention instead on the slaves 
themselves, limiting the likelihood of active engagement with their experiences in the 
form of political action and increasing the probability of feeling pity towards those 
suffering.  White abolitionists also struggled with the political logic of pity and anger as 
demonstrated by Angelina Grimké who read the ‘“pity” and “generosity” of certain whites 
as indicative of their “regard[ing] the colored man as a unfortunate inferior, rather than 
as an outraged and insulted equal”’ (Spelman 1997: 59).  The specific emotion and the 
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identity of its narrator/curator matters, therefore, in constituting the understanding and 
knowledge of her interlocutors that Jacobs seeks to elicit. 
Jacobs was aware that white northerners were ‘ignorant, misinformed or 
complacent about the meaning of slavery for slaves’ (Spelman 1997: 69), which served to 
inhibit acknowledgement of their implication in the suffering of others.  And yet, as Jacobs 
writes about the everyday violence of slavery:  
 
Senator Brown, of Mississippi, could not be ignorant of many such facts as 
these, for they are of frequent occurrence in every southern state.  Yet he 
stood up in the Congress of the United States, and declared that slavery was 
a “great moral, social, and political blessing; a blessing to the master, and a 
blessing to the slave!”’ (1987: 122).   
 
Whether this reflects an individual failure of conscience, habitual practices which erode 
an awareness of others, ideological thoughtlessness, or a combination of all is debatable 
(see Schiff 2014).  What is clear, however, is that they inhibit the possibility of recognition 
of and responsiveness to the epistemic and affective claims of the other.  Jacobs provides 
other evidence of such processes of ‘turning away’ fed by habit, ideology and self-interest 
when she writes that northerners who become southern slaveholders ‘seem to satisfy 
their consciences with the doctrine that God created the Africans to be slaves’ (1987: 44).  
In a similar fashion she speaks of the northern clergyman  
 
who comes home to publish a “South-Side View of Slavery,” and to complain 
of the exaggerations of abolitionists.  He assures people that he has been to 
the south, and seen slavery for himself; that it is a beautiful “patriarchal 
institution”; that the slaves don’t want their freedom; that they have 
hallelujah meetings, and other religious privileges.  What does he know of 
the half-starved wretches toiling from dawn till dark on the plantations? of 
mothers shrieking for their children, torn from their arms by slave traders? 
of young girls dragged down into moral filth? of pools of blood around the 
whipping post? of hounds trained to tear human flesh? of men screwed into 
cotton gins to die?  The slaveholder showed him none of these things, and 
the slaves dared not tell of it if he had asked them’ (1987: 74). 
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Setting such denials and disavowals of suffering and, therefore, responsibility, alongside 
her own emotional articulation of practices observed and experienced serves to challenge 
the reader to reflect on how their own understanding of slavery has been constructed.  
Jacobs’ counter-narrative is intended to disrupt the comfortable assumptions of white 
northerners who have previously not had to look at the suffering of others, who may have 
pitied them while perceiving them as naturally inferior and therefore undeserving of 
moral or political equality, or who have been able to convince themselves of the positive 
rationale for the institution of slavery as beneficent towards those under its yoke.  This 
epistemic disruption is furthered by her narration of the links between north and south; 
the laws which maintain northern complicity in the perpetuation of slavery and the 
racism which ideologically underpins the permissibility and desirability of such laws.  
Jacobs’ narrative is constructed in such a way as to resist the slide into a sentimental 
politics and to demand recognition of the forms and causes of the structural injustice she 
has experienced.    
  
Testimonial empathy as an ethics of encounter 
Jacobs’ narrative functions as a call for testimonial empathy which looks for a distinct 
kind of ethical-political encounter on the part of her interlocutors, requiring a disposition 
towards recognition of and responsiveness to the epistemic and affective claims of the 
other.  The responsiveness towards the other which it demands may be defined as: 
 
the acknowledgement and experience of connections between our 
everyday activities and the suffering of others.  Responsiveness is, 
importantly, not simply a matter of “knowing that” I am implicated in 
others’ suffering.  It is not only a cognitive capacity and undertaking, 
although it is partly that.  It is also, crucially, an affective stance involving 
attunement to the suffering of others and openness to acknowledging and 
experiencing the claims that such suffering might make upon me (Schiff 
2014: 34). 
 
 The distinction between knowledge and acknowledgement is important because 
it refers to both an epistemic and a political dimension.  Knowledge, for testimonial 
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empathy, requires listening without presuming a complete or full understanding of the 
other.  It does not seek to master the narrative or knowledge of the other, to subsume it 
within a pre-established hierarchy of ideas, values, and beliefs, or to reduce the other to 
fit our own limited imaginations or perspectives.   To do so would be to conflate empathy 
with a strategy of knowing intended to perpetuate, rather than disrupt, the existing 
structures of injustice.  Rather than ‘[f]orcing understandable identities, overlooking 
differences ‘for the sake of a comfortable, self-justifying rush of identification”’ (Lather 
2000: 20), the ethics of encounter integral to testimonial empathy conceives of the 
relationship as one of humility, modesty, reflexivity and respect.  Testimonial empathy in 
this understanding is not a drawing closer to become one – as suggested by some 
definitions of compassion - but rather recognising and respecting the distances between 
narrator and listener, accepting the difficulty of ‘grasping’ the position of the other and 
acknowledging that understanding cannot be a reiterated action of violence or 
imposition, of ‘appropriation in the guise of an embrace’ (Lather 2000: 20, citing 
Sommer).  Although in the moment of recognition within an encounter there is always 
the possibility that such openness can collapse into defensiveness and denials (Beausoleil 
2017: 296), acknowledgement affirms a recognition of the epistemic claim being made 
and is itself a form of political action.   
Challenging structural injustice through a process of testimonial empathy does not 
assume that one is required to adopt the perspective of another human being as is 
sometimes suggested: ‘when one presumes to adopt another perspective without 
reflection on the boundaries of one’s own body and location, more often than not one 
simply imposes the view from there upon another’ (Orlie 1994: 691).  Testimonial 
empathy looks for an awareness of the very different subject-positions present, attunes 
us to being implicated in the vulnerability of the other and begins to assist in the 
articulation of a responsibility to both reflect and to act.  Nothing about this process, 
however, is simple or linear, and there are many potential impediments to our ability to 
practice testimonial empathy.  Jacobs’ testimony makes us aware that there are many 
factors which cast doubt on the capacity of empathy and its complex, ambivalent 
dynamics to act as a conduit for political and social transformation.   
As Berlant acknowledges, ‘Self-transforming compassionate recognition and its 
cognate forms of solidarity are necessary for making political movements thrive 
contentiously against all sorts of privilege, but they have also provided a means for 
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making minor structural adjustments seem like major events, because the theatre of 
compassion is emotionally intense’ (2011: 182).  In other words, we must be aware that 
the emotional rewards of empathy may serve as a comfortable end in itself rather than 
contributing to a process of political change and an acknowledgement of responsibility 
for structural injustice.  Doubts regarding the capacity for empathy to trigger social and 
political change emerges from ‘passive empathy’ (Boler 1997: 256).  Passive empathy is 
effectively an abdication of responsibility; a satisfying emotional engagement with the 
narrative of the other that does not elicit active participation and self-reflection on the 
historical conditions within which the narrative was created.  Akin to a politics of pity, it 
permits an ‘‘epistemology of ignorance’ (of not knowing, or of not wanting to know)’ 
(Danewid 2017: 1681).  As James Baldwin wrote of the sentimentality of “protest” novels 
such as Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), whatever unsettling questions they raise ‘are 
evanescent, titillating; remote, for this has nothing to do with us, it is safely ensconced in 
the social arena, where, indeed, it has nothing to do with anyone, so that finally we receive 
a very definite thrill of virtue from the fact that we are reading such a book at all’ (1955).  
Jacobs well understood the danger of sentimental ‘womanly’ or ‘Christian sympathy’ and 
sought explicitly to counter it through her direct appeals to her interlocutors not to 
merely enjoy the emotional thrill of her account or to congratulate themselves on their 
‘kindly’ feelings without any self-reflection at their own complicity in the perpetuation of 
the structural injustice of slavery.5   
Jacobs understood compassion as becoming ‘fine-tuned through a process of 
exchange between the nonsufferer and the sufferer in which the nonsufferer’s passion is 
honed by growing awareness of the details of the sufferer’s being and situation’ (Spelman 
1997: 87).  Testimonial empathy and the ethics of encounter which underpins it thus 
implies a mode of attending to the other which is not only open to the experiences and 
interpretations of the other, but which involves a willingness to challenge our own 
assumptions and world views, our affective attachments, our historical knowledge and 
the manner of its production.  Empathy of this kind requires us to be self-critical rather 
than self-referential.  It privileges discomfort over our tendency to soothe away what may 
have troubled us through ultimately self-oriented actions.   Significantly, testimonial 
empathy requires attention to the self in order to be aware of the myriad of ‘affective 
                                                          
5 For an example of the ambivalence of the collective mobilisation of humanitarian emotions in relation to 
slavery see Kellow (2009). 
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obstacles that prevent the [listener’s] acute attention to the power relations guiding her 
response and judgements’ (Boler 1997: 265).  As Jacobs understood and sought to 
manage through her explicit choices about how much atrocity and suffering to include in 
her own narrative in an attempt to balance the reader’s response to her as victim or moral 
agent (1987: 28, 160), such affective obstacles may include moral repulsion, contempt, a 
rejection of the experience of the other, attempts to minimise the significance attached to 
their experiences or to misinterpret what is heard, ‘‘paralysis’ from ‘fear of merger [sic] 
with the atrocities being recounted’; ‘anger unwittingly directed at the narrator’; ‘a sense 
of total withdrawal and numbness’; and an ‘obsession with fact-finding’ that shuts off the 
human dynamic’ (Laub cited in Boler 1997: 265-6).  These everyday practices or habits 
of feeling, ideology, and self-interest – singularly or in combination - all work to turn us 
away from injustice and suffering in the lives of others.  They shape our desires and 
capacity to withhold empathy and work to prevent us from attending to the epistemic 
and affective claims of others. 
 
Conclusion 
The narratives of suffering as a result of structural injustices to which we are constantly 
exposed pose a number of questions regarding the construction and implementation of 
political responsibility.  In response to this puzzle – to what extent can such narratives 
lead to sustainable social and political transformation through empathic encounters – I 
offer three arguments.  First, we need to explicitly acknowledge and explore the affective 
dimensions of political responsibility which are shaped by historical, cultural, local and 
transnational encounters.  Contra Arendt, the transmission of affect through 
micropolitical encounters disintegrates conventional boundaries of the private/public 
and international political spheres and cannot be understood without being situated 
within historical narratives of difference and power.  Second, we should differentiate 
between sentimental emotions such as pity and the emotional, cognitive, and embodied 
processes of testimonial empathy.  While both are constitutive of political ‘work’, the 
latter calls for a radical reflexivity and epistemic humility that is self-critical rather than 
self-referential in its interrogation of position, privilege and power.  Third, and 
consequently, empathy must be tied to a political understanding of responsibility and 
action because ethics alone cannot be a substitute for political redress of structural 
injustices.  Jacobs’ narrative, located within the socio-political context of slavery as a 
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product of colonialism and the abolitionist movement, eloquently articulates the nexus of 
these conceptual links, embodying the transmission of affect from the ‘private’ reading of 
her narrative to the public sphere in a call for political change through an appeal for 
testimonial empathy. 
The struggle articulated by Jacobs to facilitate political responsibility for the 
structural injustice of slavery and her awareness of the obstacles that dogged her appeal 
continues to be played out in world politics.  Kurdi’s image sparked a wave of emotional 
discourse in which the question, history, and locations of political responsibility remain 
paramount.  Narratives – in a plurality of forms – are a critical part of the human face of 
contemporary issues in international relations around migration, security, conflict, 
poverty, climate and the environment.  As with other forms of injustice, the 
marginalisation of the recognition of the ‘refugee crisis’ as structural continues to 
facilitate a form of gatekeeping which shapes the effectiveness of particular kinds of 
affective discourses and their capacity to be mobilised to support legitimate accounts of 
political responsibility.  It is for this reason that nation-state apologies and reconciliation 
efforts are frequently contested because the degree to which they represent a process of 
testimonial empathy – acknowledgement of injustice and its historical and structural 
dimensions, subjective shifts of understanding, and collective political action – as 
opposed to a performative display of empathy which evades political responsibility and 
enacts a ‘turning away’ is often questioned by the state’s interlocutors (Mihai 2013: 201; 
Waterton and Wilson 2009).  Attending to the affective dynamics of narratives draws our 
attention to the constant presence of emotions and the ambivalence of the political 
processes they are constitutive of (e.g. Woodward 2004). 
As should be clear, the evocation of emotion, and empathy in particular, does not 
necessarily lead to action that is likely to address the problems posed by structural 
injustices at a macropolitical level.  The risk that narratives of suffering provide some 
interlocutors with nothing more than a ‘vicarious sensory experience that does little to 
alter their own sense of privilege’ (Chabot Davis 2004: 414) cannot be avoided.  
Recognising the distinction between a sentimental politics and testimonial empathy, 
however, allows us to better understand how these dynamics play out in practice and 
why sometimes social and political transformation occurs and at other times it does not.  
Political responsibility does not solely lie within the realm of parties, institutions and 
elections.  Subjective shifts and self-transformation as a consequence of radical 
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understanding can lead to political action at all levels of societal interaction.  Affective 
encounters with the experiences of others can disrupt our epistemic comfort and render 
visible dynamics and hierarchies hitherto unaccounted for by the powerful and 
unaccountable to the oppressed.   
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